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I. Introduction 
“If it’s a new test, why can’t they use it?”1 
This comment by Judge George B. Daniels of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York fits a wealth of 
controversy into just a few words.2 With the Supreme Court’s 
apparent limiting of general personal jurisdiction in Daimler AG 
v. Bauman3 in January of 2014, defendants across the country 
began attempts to have the cases against them dismissed on the 
grounds that the particular courts could no longer exercise general 
personal jurisdiction over them.4 These defendants believe that the 
Daimler interpretation of general personal jurisdiction 
fundamentally changed the previously controlling Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown5 test, and several judges 
in federal district courts agree.6 Spurring the controversy, 
however, are judges operating under the assumption that Daimler 
did not change the already existing Goodyear test and thus, 
denying dismissals to other defendants in the same situation.7 
Judge Daniels’s position depends on the assumption—one that he 
                                                                                                     
 1. Pete Brush, Daimler Ruling Comes to Banks’ Aid in Yen-Libor Action, 
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2014, 3:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/582588 (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See id. (noting that the judge lacked sympathy for the plaintiff’s claim 
that the “defendants had waived jurisdictional defenses regardless of Daimler by 
not asserting them earlier in the more than two-year-old case”). 
 3. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 4. See infra Part IV.A (describing cases in which judges granted such 
dismissals and others in which judges denied such dismissals). 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 6. See infra Part IV.A (describing the cases in which judges granted 
dismissals based on lack on general personal jurisdiction). 
 7. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that these denials of dismissals occur in 
cases in which defendants previously waived the personal jurisdiction defense). 
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thinks is obvious—that Daimler did create a new test.8 The 
problem, however, is that others persuasively argue that the 
Daimler and Goodyear tests are the same.9 Apart from the issue of 
whether Daimler created a new test, Judge Daniels’s comment also 
encapsulates the separate issue of whether—even if Daimler 
created a new test—defendants are entitled to relief under the new 
case, especially if they have already waived the personal 
jurisdiction defense of Rule 12(b)(2).10 This Note proceeds by 
reconciling these two issues in an attempt to propose the correct 
outcome for litigants regarding the treatment of Daimler in long-
pending cases.11  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler was a further 
development of Goodyear and personal jurisdiction law.12 In 
delivering the Court’s ruling, Justice Ginsburg declared, “[T]he 
inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-
forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and 
systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the 
State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially 
at home in the forum State.’”13 Despite the apparent intention to 
clarify the existing law on general jurisdiction, the Daimler ruling 
incited disagreement as to the extent the Goodyear rule changed 
as a result of Daimler and even as to whether Daimler changed the 
Goodyear rule at all.14 Some argue that Daimler created a much 
                                                                                                     
 8. See infra Part II.C (explaining the controversy over the relationship 
between Goodyear and Daimler). 
 9. See infra Part II.C (noting the argument that Goodyear already 
pronounced the standard repeated in Daimler). 
 10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (providing that a party must raise a defense 
based on lack of personal jurisdiction in the responsive pleading); infra Part III 
(explaining the development of retroactivity law). 
 11. See infra Part IV (proposing that Daimler must be applied retroactively 
even when defendants previously waived the personal jurisdiction defense). 
 12. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“Goodyear did 
not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum 
where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed 
those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”). 
 13. Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)). 
 14. Compare Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 
66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 197, 199 (2014) (“The Court meant what it said in 
Goodyear: general jurisdiction should be limited, except in an exceptional case, to 
a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”), and Case 
1552 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549 (2015) 
stricter test for general jurisdiction than was previously in 
existence, but others counter that the Daimler decision simply 
restated the existing Goodyear rule.15 
The disagreement over Daimler’s significance is especially 
problematic in long-pending cases in which defendants have 
moved for dismissals on the grounds that personal jurisdiction no 
longer exists because of the apparently stricter Daimler test.16 To 
decide whether to grant or deny such motions to dismiss, judges 
must first determine whether the defendant already waived the 
personal jurisdiction defense and, if so, whether the waiver will 
preclude the application of the Daimler test.17 These 
determinations require the judge to decide whether the new 
personal jurisdiction test applies retroactively and whether any 
previous waiver matters in the face of a new constitutional 
pronouncement.18 Then, if the judge allows the defendant to use 
the Daimler test and agrees that personal jurisdiction no longer 
exists under Daimler, the judge will often have the option to either 
dismiss the relevant claims or transfer the claims if there is 
another jurisdiction where personal jurisdiction does exist under 
Daimler.19 
                                                                                                     
Comment, Personal Jurisdiction—General Jurisdiction—Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 311 (2014) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg applied the 
same personal jurisdiction theory in both Goodyear and Daimler), with Linda S. 
Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the Extraterritorial Reach 
of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 707–08 (2014) (identifying Daimler 
as part of the recent trend of “declining to allow the extraterritorial reach of 
American courts over foreign nationals as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction” 
rather than a clarification of Goodyear), and Eric H. Weisblatt & Claire Frezza, 
Who to Sue and Where in ANDA Litigation: Personal Jurisdiction Post-Daimler, 
69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 351–52 (2014) (stressing that Daimler provides a “new 
rule for general jurisdiction” that requires “a stricter analysis of where a 
defendant company is ‘at home’ sufficient to cause it to be haled into court under 
general jurisdiction principles”). 
 15. See sources cited supra note 14 (providing examples of scholars’ opposing 
positions as to whether Daimler states a new test or simply restates the Goodyear 
test). 
 16. See infra Part IV (noting in particular that statutes of limitations can 
prevent plaintiffs from litigating the case again). 
 17. See infra Part IV (explaining that the decision is much less complex in 
cases in which there was no waiver). 
 18. See infra Part IV (arguing that waiver does not matter in the face of a 
new constitutional pronouncement). 
 19. See infra Part IV (arguing that judges should choose transfer over 
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In arguing that Daimler created a new test, some defendants 
have raised new personal jurisdiction defenses and achieved 
dismissals.20 Other defendants, however, have raised the same 
defenses and been denied dismissals.21 Dismissals resulting from 
the Daimler decision have been granted even when the case has 
been pending for years and the plaintiff sued under personal 
jurisdiction that was in accord with case law at the time.22 One 
judge even granted a dismissal despite the ability to transfer the 
case instead.23  
This Note argues that courts should apply the Daimler 
decision when defendants raise this newly available personal 
jurisdiction defense.24 In light of both personal jurisdiction law and 
retroactivity law, this Note argues that courts should permit 
defendants to use the new Daimler test even when the defendant 
did not raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense and thus waived the personal 
jurisdiction defense.25 This argument is qualified, however, by the 
additional argument that courts should refrain from dismissing 
the case based on a lack of personal jurisdiction under Daimler in 
favor of transferring the case when possible.26 Choosing transfer 
over dismissal when possible would mitigate the unfairness to 
                                                                                                     
dismissal when possible). 
 20. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-
GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction in light of the Daimler 
ruling); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(determining that, in light of Daimler, the district court erred in finding that it 
could exercise general jurisdiction over the appellant bank). 
 21. See, e.g., Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-
D, 2014 WL 4471606, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept 10, 2014) (denying dismissal based 
on defendant’s previous waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense); Gilmore v. 
Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying 
dismissal based in part on the argument that Daimler did not change the law as 
it was already stated in Goodyear). 
 22. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4 (denying 
transfer request even though the venue plaintiff requested had personal 
jurisdiction over defendant). 
 23. See id. (describing a situation in which transfer was an option). 
 24. See infra Part IV.A (noting that this should be the result regardless of 
whether the defendant previously waived the personal jurisdiction defense). 
 25. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that Daimler was a new constitutional 
pronouncement and thus applies retroactively). 
 26. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the unfairness of dismissal in the context 
of long-pending cases). 
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plaintiffs of having their claims in long-pending cases barred by 
statutes of limitations.27 If the claim is dismissed and the statute 
of limitations has expired, the plaintiff will not be able to bring the 
claim again in a jurisdiction where there is personal jurisdiction 
under Daimler.28  
Part II of this Note examines the development of personal 
jurisdiction,29 and Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of retroactivity.30 Part IV argues that defendants should 
be allowed to raise the new Daimler personal jurisdiction 
argument even when they failed to raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler.31 Part IV then 
examines the consequences of allowing defendants to do this in 
long-pending cases and concludes by proposing that—out of 
fairness to plaintiffs—cases should be transferred rather than 
dismissed when possible.32 
II. Development of Personal Jurisdiction Law: Goodyear to 
Daimler 
A. Pre-Goodyear Personal Jurisdiction 
Before 2011, most personal jurisdiction jurisprudence focused 
on specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.33 The Court first 
began to distinguish between what came to be known as specific 
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction in 1945 with International 
                                                                                                     
 27. See infra Part IV.B (noting that transfer will not always be possible). 
 28. See infra Part IV.B (emphasizing the unfairness of this outcome if 
transfer was an option). 
 29. See infra Part II (focusing on the relationship between Goodyear and 
Daimler). 
 30. See infra Part III (focusing on the current state of adjudicative 
retroactivity law). 
 31. See infra Part IV (emphasizing that new constitutional pronouncements 
always apply retroactively). 
 32. See infra Part IV (noting that this preferable result is not always 
possible). 
 33. See Camilla Cohen, Case Comment, Goodyear Dunlop’s Failed Attempt 
to Refine the Scope of General Personal Jurisdiction, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1405, 1406 
(2013) (emphasizing the limited scope and clarity of general jurisdiction case law 
before the Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in 
2011). 
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Shoe Co. v. Washington.34 The case involved a suit brought by the 
state of Washington against a defendant that failed to contribute 
to the state unemployment compensation fund.35 The state 
statutes required the defendant to make annual contributions to 
the fund based on its employees’ services in the state.36 
International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Missouri, but had manufacturing and 
distribution branches in other states, including Washington.37 
International Shoe Co. argued that the presence of its salesmen in 
Washington was not sufficient for the “presence” requirement of 
personal jurisdiction and that, consequently, the company was not 
subject to jurisdiction in Washington.38 
The Court disagreed with International Shoe Co.’s presence 
argument and created a new test for general personal 
jurisdiction—the minimum contacts test—which requires a 
defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts with the state 
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”39 In creating this test, 
the Court distinguished between specific and general jurisdiction 
for the first time, holding that International Shoe Co. was subject 
to specific jurisdiction in Washington because the activities 
conducted by the employees in Washington gave rise to the suit.40 
The Court distinguished this definition of specific jurisdiction with 
its characterization of general jurisdiction as follows:  
                                                                                                     
 34. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) 
(distinguishing between specific and general jurisdiction on the basis that where 
there is not continuous activity in the forum state, suits must be related to the 
activity, but where there is continuous activity in the forum state, suits can be 
entirely unrelated to the activity). 
 35. See id. at 311 (noting that the state unemployment compensation fund 
was “enacted by state statutes”). 
 36. See id. at 312 (defining the required contribution as “a specified 
percentage of the wages payable annually” to the employee). 
 37. See id. at 313 (noting also that the defendant has no office in Washington 
and “makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there”). 
 38. See id. at 314–15 (emphasizing that the presence requirement must be 
satisfied for there to be jurisdiction by the state courts). 
 39. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 40. See id. at 320 (“The obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those 
very activities.”). 
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While it has been held in cases on which appellant relies that 
continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to 
support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits 
unrelated to that activity, there have been instances in which 
the continuous corporate operations within a state were 
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit 
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.41 
This first articulation of general jurisdiction adopted a new 
analysis based on “continuous and systematic” activities, but did 
not define what constitutes sufficiently continuous and systematic 
contacts with the jurisdiction.42 In later decisions culminating with 
Daimler, the Court repeatedly attempted to define the bounds of 
general jurisdiction.43 
The only two cases analyzing the scope of general personal 
jurisdiction prior to 2011 were Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Co.44 in 1952 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. 
Hall45 in 1984.46 In Perkins, the Court held that general 
jurisdiction was appropriate because there was corporate 
headquarters-level activity by the defendant in the forum state.47 
The Court explained that it used the International Shoe analysis 
to reach this holding, but did not provide a detailed account of the 
Court’s reasoning in determining that the facts of the case satisfied 
the International Shoe analysis.48 Helicopteros involved a wrongful 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 318 (citations omitted). 
 42. See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the 
Language of General Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 979–80 (2012) 
(indicating that future decisions would necessarily clarify the general jurisdiction 
analysis). 
 43. See infra Parts II.B–C (focusing on the extent to which Daimler built on 
the Goodyear standard for general personal jurisdiction). 
 44. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 45. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 46. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 1406 (“Consequently, lower courts were left 
to develop the contours of general personal jurisdiction, resulting in a hodgepodge 
of inconsistent holdings that often conflated several important distinctions 
between specific and general jurisdiction.”). 
 47. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445 (“The amount and kind of activities which 
must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to 
make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that 
state are to be determined in each case.”). 
 48. See Pielemeier, supra note 42, at 977 (noting that the Court offered “little 
further reasoning beyond quotation of International Shoe’s discussion of suits on 
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death suit brought in Texas courts against the corporate 
Colombian owner of a helicopter that crashed in Peru, killing four 
U.S. citizen passengers.49 The Court held that the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state of Texas were insufficient to support 
a conclusion of general jurisdiction because they were not 
continuous and systematic.50 In reaching this holding, the Court 
disagreed with the Texas Supreme Court’s assessment that the 
corporation’s Texas purchases and training trips constituted 
sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction.51 
It is difficult to reconcile Helicopteros and Perkins because 
Helicopteros failed to explain why the contacts in Perkins were 
stronger than those in Helicopteros in a manner that would provide 
other courts with any framework for analyzing general jurisdiction 
under different sets of facts.52 The apparent new test for whether 
a defendant has “the kind of continuous and systematic general 
business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins” left much 
open to interpretation by the lower courts.53 Perkins made clear 
that “[c]ontacts warranting a conclusion that the forum state was 
the defendant’s principal place of business” justified the exercise of 
general jurisdiction, and Helicopteros explained that “purchases of 
millions of dollars worth of products and training over a seven-year 
period in the forum state were not sufficient.”54 The very limited 
scope of these examples, however, left lower courts without 
                                                                                                     
causes of action arising from dealings distinct from forum activities, and a lengthy 
factual description of the defendant’s activities in Ohio”). 
 49. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409–10 (noting that the corporation’s 
principal place of business was also in Colombia and that its business was 
“providing helicopter transportation for oil and construction companies in South 
America”). 
 50. See id. at 416 (examining all of the defendant’s contacts with the Texas 
forum in turn and concluding that they do not “constitute the kind of continuous 
and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins”). 
 51. See id. at 417 (declaring that Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown 
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), “makes clear that purchases and related trips, standing 
alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State’s assertion of jurisdiction”). 
 52. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 1411 (explaining that both the Perkins and 
Helicopteros opinions simply listed the defendants’ contacts with the forum in 
each case without any meaningful discussion as to why some contacts were 
considered stronger than others). 
 53. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). 
 54. Pielemeier, supra note 42, at 979–80. 
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direction on how to apply the cases to other situations.55 This 
confusion required the Court to provide additional guidance on the 
general jurisdiction analysis in subsequent decisions.56 
B. General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear 
The Court in Goodyear established that general jurisdiction 
could be exerted over a defendant corporation only when the 
corporation is fairly regarded as “at home” in the forum state.57 
In that case, a bus accident in France killed two minor North 
Carolina residents, and the estates of the minors brought suit 
against Goodyear USA and its foreign subsidiaries for producing 
the defective bus tire.58 The foreign subsidiaries moved to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction and the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion.59 The 
Supreme Court disagreed with the North Carolina court’s stream-
of-commerce analysis on the basis that “ties serving to bolster the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination 
that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over 
a defendant.”60 The Court ultimately concluded that general 
personal jurisdiction, unlike specific personal jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                     
 55. See id. at 979 (noting that lower courts have reached a “wide variety of 
results” using International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros as guidance). 
 56. See infra Parts II.B–C (explaining how Goodyear and then Daimler 
provided this necessary guidance). 
 57. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 
2857 (2011) (declaring that petitioners were not at home in North Carolina 
because “[t]heir attenuated connections to the State . . . fall far short of the 
‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary to entertain a 
suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the 
State” (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416)). 
 58. See id. at 2850 (noting that the named defendants included Goodyear 
USA and three of its subsidiaries in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg). 
 59. See id. (explaining the determination of the Court of Appeals that the 
higher threshold for general jurisdiction was crossed “when petitioners placed 
their tires ‘in the stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the 
extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina’” (quoting Brown v. 
Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (2009))).  
 60. Id. at 2855. 
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requires more than continuous activity within a state.61 The 
defendant must be at home in the forum.62 
This rule for general jurisdiction as stated in Goodyear did not, 
however, provide the lower courts with meaningful guidance for 
deciding future general jurisdiction issues.63 The opinion makes 
clear that general jurisdiction can no longer be based solely on 
regular sales within the forum and that general jurisdiction 
requires a significantly higher connection to a forum than specific 
jurisdiction.64 Yet, the opinion is much less clear on what is 
required for a defendant to be at home in a forum.65 The opinion 
suggests that a corporate defendant will be considered at home 
only in its state of incorporation and principal place of business, 
but does not explicitly state such strict limitations for general 
jurisdiction.66 This suggestion creates additional problems for 
plaintiffs wishing to litigate against foreign corporations in the 
United States. Such restrictions would entirely preclude a plaintiff 
from bringing suit in any U.S. forum.67 The Court addressed this 
unique issue three years after the Goodyear decision in Daimler.68 
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. at 2856 (emphasizing that continuous activity of any sort will not 
necessarily be sufficient for general personal jurisdiction). 
 62. See id. (explaining that the defendant’s ties to the forum State must 
“render them essentially at home” there). 
 63. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 1406–07 (“While the decision may be 
interpreted as refining the test for asserting general jurisdiction, Goodyear could 
just as easily be narrowly confined to its facts in light of the manner in which the 
Court framed the issues.”). 
 64. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 549 
(2012) (arguing that the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction 
makes “clear that limited sales do not satisfy the ‘substantial’ activity or 
‘continuous and systematic’ contacts required for general jurisdiction”). 
 65. See Pielemeier, supra note 42, at 990 (“[T]he opinion signals that other 
bases for general jurisdiction will need to entail substantial contacts warranting 
the conclusion that the defendant is ‘at home’ in the forum.”). 
 66. See id. (explaining that the oral argument transcript shows that several 
justices suggested general jurisdiction would be limited to the defendant’s state 
of incorporation and principal place of business). 
 67. See id. at 991 (suggesting that a better test for foreign corporate 
defendants would find “a place where they are ‘at home’ in the United States”). 
 68. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (holding that 
California could not exercise general jurisdiction over a German corporation 
because the corporation was not incorporated in California and did not have its 
principal place of business in California). 
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C. General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler 
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court reversed the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision that personal 
jurisdiction existed over the defendant German corporation, 
Daimler AG.69 Twenty-two Argentinian residents sued Daimler 
AG under the Alien Tort Statute70 and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act71 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California.72 The plaintiffs alleged that a Daimler AG 
subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated with 
perpetrators of Argentina’s Dirty War to harm and kill employees 
of the Argentinian subsidiary and those employees’ families.73 
These Argentinian victims asserted that the Northern District of 
California had jurisdiction over Daimler AG because of the 
California contacts of another Daimler AG subsidiary, Mercedes-
Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA).74 Daimler AG moved to dismiss in the 
Northern District of California for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
arguing that the California contacts of the U.S. subsidiary were 
not a sufficient basis for subjecting the foreign corporation to the 
court’s general jurisdiction.75 The U.S. subsidiary was incorporated 
in Delaware, had its principal place of business in New Jersey, had 
several offices in California, and distributed its vehicles to many 
                                                                                                     
 69. See id. at 753 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit based its ruling on the 
apparent satisfaction of the agency test). 
 70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 71. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 
73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)) (“An individual who, 
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation subjects 
an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that 
individual.”). 
 72. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (noting that claims were also filed under 
the laws of California and Argentina for wrongful death and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress). 
 73. See id. at 751–52 (emphasizing that none of the incidents in the 
complaint occurred in the United States). 
 74. See id. at 752 (explaining that MBUSA purchases vehicles from Daimler 
AG in Germany and imports them to the United States for resale). 
 75. See id. (explaining that in response to the motion, plaintiffs “submitted 
declarations and exhibits purporting to demonstrate the presence of Daimler 
itself in California”). 
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parts of the United States, including California.76 The district 
court determined that the distribution of vehicles to California was 
insufficient to exert personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG and 
granted Daimler AG’s motion to dismiss, but the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed and reversed.77 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit ruling, the Supreme Court 
addressed “whether a foreign corporation may be subjected to a 
court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state 
subsidiary.”78 In the course of establishing that Daimler AG was 
not at home in the forum state, the Court never expressly 
addressed the Ninth Circuit’s agency theory that appeared “to 
subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they 
have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would 
sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we 
rejected in Goodyear.”79 Although the Court probably would have 
rejected the agency theory, it did not reach the issue because—
even assuming that the U.S. subsidiary was at home in 
California—Daimler AG’s California contacts were nonetheless too 
slim to render the foreign corporation at home in the state.80 The 
Court also addressed the transnational issues that it failed to 
address comprehensively in Goodyear.81 The Court justified its 
strict interpretation of Goodyear in part because of the risks a more 
lenient interpretation would have on international comity.82 
There has been much debate over what exactly the Daimler 
Court accomplished with its ruling.83 Some scholars argue that the 
                                                                                                     
 76. See id. (“MBUSA has multiple California-based facilities, including a 
regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a 
Classic Center in Irvine.”). 
 77. See id. (“[O]ver 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take 
place in California, and MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s 
worldwide sales.”). 
 78. Id. at 759. 
 79. Id. at 760. 
 80. See id. at 759 (“Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations 
with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.”). 
 81. See id. at 762 (noting that the Ninth Circuit “paid little heed to the risks 
to international comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed”). 
 82. See id. at 763 (explaining that other nations have more limited 
approaches to personal jurisdiction and “that subjecting Daimler AG to general 
jurisdiction in California would not accord with the ‘fair play and substantial 
justice’ due process demands”). 
 83. See, e.g., Childress III, supra note 14, at 201–02 (examining what the 
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Daimler decision imposed additional limitations on personal 
jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Goodyear.84 Other 
scholars take the position that Daimler simply reiterated the 
already-existing Goodyear test.85 On the one hand, the fact that the 
Ninth Circuit made its decision before the Goodyear ruling—and 
had it made the decision after Goodyear, it likely would have 
decided differently—supports those advocating for the latter 
position.86 In light of the Goodyear ruling, the Daimler plaintiffs 
overreach “[i]n asking the court to essentially go back to the 
drawing board and ignore the specific showings required by 
general personal jurisdiction.”87 On the other hand, the fact that 
Goodyear did not specifically address how vicarious jurisdiction 
fits into the “essentially at home” standard supports those 
advocating for the former position.88 This is particularly relevant 
                                                                                                     
Daimler court failed to address and what will be the grounds for future general 
jurisdiction disagreements); Hoffheimer, supra note 64, at 551–52 (arguing that 
the decision could support both a flexible approach “that approves general 
jurisdiction in multiple states where a foreign corporation has strong permanent 
connections” and a restrictive approach “that limits general jurisdiction to the 
place of incorporation and . . . the principal place of business”). 
 84. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 14, at 707–08 (identifying Daimler as part 
of the recent trend of “declining to allow the extraterritorial reach of American 
courts over foreign nationals as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction” rather 
than a clarification of Goodyear); Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 14, at 351–52 
(stressing that Daimler provides a “new rule for general jurisdiction” that 
requires “a stricter analysis of where a defendant company is ‘at home’ sufficient 
to cause it to be haled into court under general jurisdiction principles”). 
 85. See, e.g., Childress III, supra note 14, at 199 (“The Court meant what it 
said in Goodyear: general jurisdiction should be limited, except in an exceptional 
case, to a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”); 
Case Comment, supra note 14, at 311 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg applied the 
same personal jurisdiction theory in both Goodyear and Daimler). 
 86. See Todd W. Noelle, Supreme Court Commentary, At Home in the Outer 
Limits: DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman and the Bounds of General Personal 
Jurisdiction, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 17, 40 (2013) (“Unless the 
Court decides to expand its general jurisdiction jurisprudence far beyond where 
it currently stands, the Court will almost certainly reverse.”). 
 87. Id. at 41. 
 88. See Lonny Hoffman, Further Thinking About Vicarious Jurisdiction: 
Reflecting on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to Daimler v. Bauman, 34 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 765, 782 (2013) (“[T]he key question remaining is whether there 
is anything in Goodyear’s articulation of the ‘essentially at home standard’ that 
would preclude the kind of excessive vicarious jurisdiction exercises that courts 
frequently permit.”). In this context, the term “vicarious jurisdiction” describes 
“any attempt that is made to impute the contacts of one person or entity to 
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for foreign corporations such as Daimler AG because “the 
distinction between domestic and foreign entities indeed may have 
been precisely what the [Goodyear] Court had in mind when it 
intentionally left the door more ajar than it otherwise needed.”89 
This observation renders plausible the argument that Daimler did 
create a new general personal jurisdiction test—one that is 
particularly important for foreign defendants—rather than simply 
restating the already existing Goodyear test.90 
Both of the aforementioned positions demonstrate merit. The 
confusion as to the relationship between Goodyear and Daimler 
has resulted in inconsistent results among lower courts in dealing 
with defendants’ recent assertions of Daimler in long-pending 
cases.91 The most logical way to reconcile the two positions—and 
the recommendation of this Note—is to conclude that Daimler is 
not inconsistent with Goodyear because Daimler builds off of the 
earlier Goodyear test.92 In building off of Goodyear, however, 
Daimler does provide its own distinct test that offers more specific 
guidance to lower courts on how to apply the at home standard, 
especially to foreign corporate defendants.93 The previous lack of 
clarification on how to apply the somewhat cryptic Goodyear test 
to these specific types of defendants led many courts and litigants 
to believe that the test was more lenient than the Court meant it 
to be when it decided Goodyear.94 Daimler necessarily developed a 
                                                                                                     
another.” Id. at 765. The term is most often associated with corporate entities 
such as Daimler AG, especially “when the plaintiff tries to establish jurisdiction 
over a nonresident corporate parent by looking to the forum activities of its 
subsidiaries.” Id. at 765–66. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 783 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s Daimler ruling “stretches 
the reasonableness of exercising general jurisdiction vicariously beyond any 
constitutional limit that Justice Ginsburg’s Goodyear opinion can plausibly be 
read to recognize”). 
 91. See infra Part IV (arguing that these inconsistent results are a 
consequence of misunderstandings as to the relevant personal jurisdiction and 
retroactivity law). 
 92. See Stephanie Denker, Comment, The Future of General Jurisdiction: 
The Effects of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145, 162 
(2014) (arguing that Daimler does not overrule Goodyear, but rather clarifies it). 
 93. See id. (“The Court’s reliance on Goodyear’s ‘at home’ standard and the 
Court’s application of the paradigm forum states in the Goodyear opinion 
indicates its reluctance to stray from precedent.”). 
 94. See Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-GAO, 
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clearer and more specific test because many courts were applying 
Goodyear incorrectly.95 Thus, Daimler does constitute a new 
constitutional pronouncement even though is it not inconsistent 
with Goodyear.96 This Note’s subsequent arguments elaborate on 
the logic of this proposed reconciliation.97 
III. Retroactivity and Exceptions to Retroactivity 
A. Adjudicative Retroactivity Versus Legislative Retroactivity 
In any discussion of retroactivity doctrine, the distinction 
between adjudicative retroactivity and legislative retroactivity is 
critical.98 An analysis of adjudicative retroactivity requires 
recognition of the fact that judicial decisions concern three 
different types of law: statutes, common law, and the 
Constitution.99 Adjudicative retroactivity as to the interpretation 
of federal statutes has always been considered appropriate because 
the language of the rules does not change as a result of the judicial 
decision; the new decision simply declares that previous 
interpretations of the language were wrong.100 Adjudicative 
retroactivity as to the common law is unique because—unlike with 
statutes—the positive source of the law is the evolution of the 
judicial decisions themselves.101 
                                                                                                     
2014 WL 4964506, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (demonstrating a situation in 
which a judge found personal jurisdiction to exist in its earlier application of 
Goodyear, but not later when the defendant raised Daimler). 
 95. See id. (describing how the judge reached different conclusions using the 
Goodyear and Daimler versions of the general personal jurisdiction test). 
 96. See Denker, supra note 92, at 162 (emphasizing that the underlying 
premise is the same in both Goodyear and Daimler). 
 97. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that Daimler must be applied 
retroactively because it is a development of Goodyear and thus, a new 
constitutional pronouncement). 
 98. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth 
of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1999) (differentiating 
between several sources of law). 
 99. See id. (“The differing positive sources of the law being changed impart 
a different character to each type of decision.”). 
 100. See id. (“Consequently, retroactivity in statutory interpretation is not 
very difficult.”). 
 101. See id. (“With no positive source independent of judicial decisions, the 
law must change as the decisions change. Consequently, it makes sense to 
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The interpretation of constitutional law is analogous to 
common law in that the law is the evolution of judicial decisions.102 
While the Constitution itself is a source of positive law separate 
from the evolution of judicial decisions, “the view that the 
Constitution means now what it always has, and always will, has 
serious difficulties.”103 Much of the historical difficulty associated 
with retroactivity rules for constitutional interpretation comes 
from the fact that complex case law guides constitutional 
interpretation rather than comprehensive statutes or 
constitutional provisions.104 Yet, despite the traditional 
recognition of the unique nature of the retroactivity of 
constitutional law, the Court has retreated from this view in favor 
of treating retroactivity the same for both constitutional law and 
statutory interpretation.105 Today, the same presumption of 
retroactivity that has always existed for statutory interpretation 
now also exists for constitutional interpretation.106 
Unlike adjudicative retroactivity, legislative retroactivity is 
generally not appropriate.107 Despite this general presumption 
that legislation is not retroactive, the matter is complicated by the 
distinction between procedural legislative retroactivity and 
substantive legislative retroactivity.108 While new legislation that 
would have a substantive effect on litigants is prospective and does 
not apply to pending cases, legislation that is considered 
                                                                                                     
distinguish between old law and new law.”). 
 102. See id. at 1076–77 (describing the Constitution as similar to common law 
in that the doctrines embodied in the text have evolved over time through judicial 
decisions). 
 103. Id. at 1076. 
 104. See Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 105, 106 (2010) (explaining that, as a result of retroactivity rules 
being completely judge-made, the Supreme Court has drastically changed the 
rules on multiple occasions in the last fifty years). 
 105. See infra Part III.B (emphasizing that there is a firm rule of retroactivity 
for adjudication generally). 
 106. See infra Part III.B (explaining why new constitutional pronouncements 
are always retroactive). 
 107. See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory 
Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1016 (2006) (“In their ideal forms, legislation is 
prospective and general, while adjudication is retrospective and particular.”). 
 108. See Dane Reed Ullian, Note, Retroactive Application of State Long-Arm 
Statutes, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1653, 1662 (2013) (noting that there is an exception to 
the general prospectivity rule for procedural and remedial laws). 
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procedural or remedial—not substantive—will generally have a 
retroactive effect on litigants in pending cases.109 As will be 
discussed later in this Note, personal jurisdiction long-arm 
statutes are generally considered procedural or remedial—not 
substantive—and, thus, courts apply the statutes retroactively to 
litigants in cases on direct review.110  
Because general personal jurisdiction as it was clarified by 
Daimler should, by analogy, also be considered procedural or 
remedial, it makes some sense for defendants to argue that 
Daimler should be applied retrospectively for this reason.111 By 
extension, it would also make sense for plaintiffs to counter with 
the argument that a previous waiver of the personal jurisdiction 
defense operates as an indirect restraint on retroactivity.112 Yet, as 
will be argued throughout the rest of this Note, the Court’s 
clarification of Goodyear through Daimler is a matter of 
constitutional interpretation by the judiciary, not legislation 
through a statute.113 Thus, instead of relying on a few exceptions 
to the presumption of legislative prospectivity, defendants will be 
able to utilize the much more advantageous firm rule of 
adjudicative retroactivity.114 Unlike with the long-arm statutes, 
plaintiffs will not be able to argue that there is any indirect 
restraint on retroactivity, as there are no exceptions to 
adjudicative retroactivity.115 
                                                                                                     
 109. See id. at 1663 (“Substantive laws either modify or enhance a preexisting 
right or create a right where one did not exist. Procedural laws, on the other hand, 
address the means by which one vindicates a preexisting right.”). 
 110. See infra Part III.C (explaining that this conclusion is based on 
legislative retroactivity law). 
 111. See infra Part III.C (explaining the difference between long-arm statutes 
and Supreme Court decisions in the retroactivity context). 
 112. See infra Part III.C (attempting to apply retroactivity law in the personal 
jurisdiction context). 
 113. See infra Part III.B (emphasizing that the law of legislative retroactivity 
does not apply to long-pending cases deciding whether to allow defendants to use 
Daimler). 
 114. See infra Part III.B (explaining that adjudicative retroactivity is more 
favorable to defendants because new constitutional pronouncements are always 
retroactive). 
 115. See infra Part III.C (rejecting the argument that principles of legislative 
retroactivity apply to the long-pending cases at issue in this Note). 
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B. General Rule for Adjudicative Retroactivity 
Before 1971, the law of adjudicative retroactivity was confused 
and vague.116 The first attempt to coherently define the law of 
adjudicative retroactivity came with the Supreme Court’s delivery 
of a three-factor test for deciding whether a judgment applies 
retroactively in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.117 Because the test 
operates under a presumption of retroactivity, “a litigant seeking 
prospective-only application must firmly convince a court that each 
factor (of the three) factors favors such a decision.”118 The Court 
followed this test until the 1990s when it delivered three decisions, 
the final and most decisive of which was Harper v. Virginia 
Department of Taxation.119 Harper rejected the Chevron Oil test 
and the notion that the Court could limit the retroactivity of new 
constitutional decisions.120  
In considering whether new law should be applied only 
prospectively, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
prospective application is justified by the potential unfairness of 
one or more parties’ reliance on the previous law.121 The Court then 
provided the new general rule for the retroactivity of constitutional 
issues: when the Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to a 
specific case before it, that rule has controlling—and retroactive—
effect for all cases open on direct review.122 Despite the Court’s 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in 
American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 45 (2014) (describing “an initial period of 
infrequent and unreflective use of non-retroactivity” by federal courts). 
 117. See 404 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1971) (defining the three factors as whether the 
decision establishes a new principle of law, whether retroactive application will 
further the purpose and effect of the rule, and whether the retroactivity could 
produce inequitable results). 
 118. Kay, supra note 116, at 42. 
 119. 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
 120. See Kay, supra note 116, at 47–48 (noting that those three decisions were 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990), James B. 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), and Harper). 
 121. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application 
of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 813 (2003) (“Eventually, 
the Court reverted to a firm rule of retroactive application in criminal cases on 
direct review, and now it appears to have done the same in the civil arena.”). 
 122. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (explaining that the new interpretation must 
be given retroactive effect “regardless of whether such events predate or postdate 
our announcement of the rule”). 
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hesitance to apply decisions retroactively for fear of disrupting 
justified reliance on previous decisions, the Court articulated the 
new rule in Harper in part because of the significant costs of the 
case-by-case approach advocated by Chevron Oil.123 Another policy 
rationale for the Harper rule was the role of the judiciary and the 
separation of powers doctrine.124 As stated by Justice Scalia in his 
concurrence, “Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of 
judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis.”125 As Justice 
Scalia previously articulated, prospective decisionmaking would 
infringe on the legislature’s domain of creating law and go beyond 
the judiciary’s mandate of interpreting existing law.126 
Prior to Harper—which eliminated prospectivity in the civil 
arena—the Court had already established a firm rule of 
retroactivity in the criminal arena with Griffith v. Kentucky127 six 
years earlier.128 Although the Court was slower to eliminate 
prospectivity in civil cases, the rationale for firm retroactivity is 
the same in both types of cases.129 As Justice Blackmun articulated 
in Griffith regarding the Court’s mandate to adjudicate specific 
cases and controversies, “each case usually becomes the vehicle for 
announcement of a new rule. But after we have decided a new rule 
in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review requires that 
                                                                                                     
 123. See Mark Strasser, Constitutional Limitations and Baehr Possibilities: 
On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations, and Manifest Injustice, 29 
RUTGERS L.J. 271, 304 (1998) (“Thus, the Court’s position now seems to be that it 
will retroactively apply its most recent interpretation of federal law, justified 
expectations or reliance interests of the parties notwithstanding.”). 
 124. See Kay, supra note 116, at 49 (explaining that the Court’s “deviation 
from the judicial role” was a central reason for subsequent “decisions retreating 
from prospective judgments”). 
 125. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 126. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (describing the view “that prospective decisionmaking is 
incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to 
prescribe what it shall be”). 
 127. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 128. See id. at 322 (“[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to 
criminal cases pending on direct review violated basic norms of constitutional 
adjudication.”). 
 129. See id. (describing the “settled principles” of judicial review that apply to 
both criminal and civil cases as justification for a firm rule of retroactivity). 
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we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”130 
A second problem with prospectivity in both civil and criminal 
cases is that such a rule would necessarily treat similarly situated 
litigants differently.131 In 1993, the Court finally acknowledged 
that these same principles require retroactivity in the civil arena 
as well.132 
An important element of the Harper retroactivity definition is 
that the new Supreme Court ruling applies only to cases “open on 
direct review.”133 “[T]he need for finality” justifies limiting 
retroactive application of new rules to cases on direct review.134 
While already-decided cases are not affected by this retroactivity 
rule, all pending cases are bound by it, regardless of how long the 
case has been pending.135 It does not matter that the litigants and 
the courts in long-pending cases may have been relying on the 
previous law for years.136 For all the costs associated with the 
earlier Chevron case-by-case approach to retroactive application of 
new federal rules, a significant benefit was the discretion it left to 
judges to apply the prospectivity doctrine in cases in which the 
retroactivity doctrine would be particularly inequitable.137 The 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 322–23. 
 131. See id. at 323 (“[T]he problem with not applying new rules to cases 
pending on direct review is ‘the actual inequity that results when the Court 
chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance 
beneficiary’ of a new rule.”). 
 132. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 89 (1993) (holding that, 
in accord with Griffith, “this Court’s application of a rule of federal law to the 
parties before the Court requires every court to give retroactive effect to that 
decision”). 
 133. Id. at 97. 
 134. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991) 
(“[O]nce suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new 
rule cannot reopen the door already closed.”). 
 135. See David Lehn, Note, Adjudicative Retroactivity as a Preclusion 
Problem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563, 572 
(2004) (“[I]f the balance favors retroactivity, the new law is retroactive if and only 
if they are not yet final.”). 
 136. See Robert J. Sweeney, Note, Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation: 
Of Pernicious Abstractions and the Death of Precedent, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 833, 
835 (1994) (“No matter how loudly the facts of a subsequent case might scream 
out for the equitable application of the non-retrospectivity doctrine, that doctrine 
may no longer be used if it was not employed in the first case.”). 
 137. See id. at 869 (suggesting that by using Harper to overrule Chevron, “the 
Court avoided the hard case where the facts might cry out for the equitable 
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Chevron rule was in large part justified by a policy of fairness to 
litigants who had relied on existing law.138  
If Chevron was still the retroactivity rule today, it seems likely 
that applying the new Daimler decision to the long-pending cases 
at issue would be considered so inequitable as to justify the use of 
the prospectivity doctrine.139 Such inequity is especially acute in 
situations where the plaintiffs could have brought the case in a 
different U.S. court where personal jurisdiction still would have 
existed under Daimler.140 These plaintiffs might have brought the 
case elsewhere had they known of the Daimler rule at the time, but 
now are barred from doing so because of the relevant statute of 
limitations.141 Statutes of limitations with tolling provisions might 
aid some plaintiffs, but not all statutes allow tolling and those that 
do will not benefit all plaintiffs.142 When tolling is permitted, it 
operates only from the point a suit is filed until the point the suit 
is dismissed.143 If a judge dismisses for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, the tolling effect of filing the first action will not help 
in cases filed right before the expiration of the statute of 
                                                                                                     
application of the prospectivity doctrine”). 
 138. See Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, 
Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1560 (1998) (“From the 
earliest cases at the state and federal level, rules of law were not given retroactive 
effect in order to protect those who had in good faith and with good reason relied 
upon and acted in accordance with the prior rule.”). 
 139. See id. (noting that it would be equitable to apply the prospectivity 
doctrine in cases where, “for example, a deserving litigant who had the misfortune 
to bring the right lawsuit at the wrong time might be cheated out of the 
opportunity to obtain a remedy”). 
 140. See id. (“Post-Griffith in the criminal area and post-Harper in the civil, 
fairness in the sense of protecting reliance interests has given way to fairness in 
the sense of equity or equal treatment.”). 
 141. See id. (arguing that Chevron had the capacity to avoid such extremely 
inequitable consequences for plaintiffs). 
 142. See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and 
Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 810–11 (2006) (explaining that the 
applicable state or federal statute of limitations may or may not have a 
corresponding tolling provision). 
 143. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974) (“[T]he 
mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time 
limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal 
courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances 
not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.”). 
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limitations.144 Plaintiffs in these cases will not have time to refile 
the suit in the appropriate jurisdiction.145 Thus, Chevron could 
mitigate the unfairness to plaintiffs of dismissals in which any 
tolling of the statute of limitations is inapplicable or unhelpful.146 
There is a limited exception to the sometimes ineffective 
nature of tolling provisions.147 Some jurisdictions allow a judge to 
dismiss a case without prejudice subject to reinstatement.148 If the 
plaintiff complies with the court-imposed conditions, the plaintiff 
can refile the case within the time period prescribed by the 
judge.149 But like tolling provisions generally, not all jurisdictions 
allow this exception.150 More importantly, the exception does not 
provide a solution to the unfairness of allowing defendants to raise 
Daimler because a judge without jurisdiction over a defendant 
cannot impose conditions regarding the case.151 
The new Harper rule—unlike the Chevron rule that had the 
potential to mitigate unfairness to plaintiffs—makes clear that 
there is no room for any equitable exception in the retroactivity 
doctrine.152 If the Supreme Court announces a new rule while a 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Statute of Limitations—Tolling—Dismissal, 227 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 
2000), 16 NO. 1 FED. LITIGATOR 10, 10 (2001) (“Filing suit stops the running of the 
statute of limitations—but only contingently.”). 
 145. See id. (describing the frequent inability of tolling provisions to address 
the unfairness of statutes of limitations in the face of dismissal). 
 146. See id. (emphasizing the general rule that cases dismissed without 
prejudice end any tolling of the statute of limitations). 
 147. See Don Zupanec, Statute of Limitations—Tolling—Dismissal Without 
Prejudice—Reinstatement, 20 NO. 7 FED. LITIGATOR 5, 5 (2005) (“When a timely 
complaint is dismissed without prejudice and the dismissal order sets conditions 
for reinstatement within a specified period of time, the statute of limitations is 
tolled if the conditions are satisfied by the deadline.”). 
 148. See id. (describing a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that this limited exception allows the statute of limitations to be 
tolled if the plaintiff satisfies the conditions of reinstatement (citing Brennan v. 
Kulick, 407 F.3d 603 (3rd Cir. 2005))). 
 149. See id. (“Because only a limited amount of time is available for satisfying 
the conditions, a plaintiff must act promptly or see the dismissal become a 
dismissal with prejudice and preclude refiling.”). 
 150. See id. (suggesting that even fewer jurisdictions recognize this exception 
than those that recognize tolling). 
 151. See id. (emphasizing that the noted exception has extremely limited 
application). 
 152. See Teresa A. Dondlinger, Note, Retroactivity and the Remains of 
Chevron Oil After Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 47 TAX LAW. 455, 
463 (1994) (“The result [of Harper] is that the issue of retroactivity will be 
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case is pending, the judge presiding over the pending case must 
allow litigants to utilize the new rule.153 Whereas the Chevron rule 
focused on policies of fairness and reliance, the new Harper rule 
focuses on a policy of equal treatment.154  
It appears that, in deciding the current retroactivity rule, the 
Court foresaw the potential for unfairness to plaintiffs in cases 
such as those at issue in this Note, but decided to place greater 
value on equality at the expense of fairness.155 The value placed on 
equality prevents the Court’s decisions from applying only to a 
single case when many others confronting the same issue are open 
on direct review.156 The argument is that fairness and reliance—
while not unimportant—cannot coexist with equality, which the 
Court has prioritized.157 In making this value judgment, it is likely 
that the Court also considered separation of powers issues.158 The 
making of prospective decisions is reserved to the legislature, and 
allowing courts to act prospectively in any degree would defy 
constitutional limits on the judiciary.159 
The rule that new judicial decisions affecting constitutional 
issues are retroactive, as stated in Harper, has been affirmed in 
                                                                                                     
determined without regard ‘to the particular equities of individual parties’ 
claims.’” (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993))). 
 153. See id. at 466 (emphasizing that the Harper decision “virtually 
guaranteed that all new rules of law will be applied retroactively”). 
 154. See Stephens, supra note 138, at 1560–61 (“[S]upporters of the new 
retroactivity doctrines have argued that it is unfair to award one party the benefit 
of a new constitutional rule, while denying it to all others similarly situated who 
were not lucky enough to reach the Supreme Court first.”). 
 155. See id. at 1561 (describing this blanket value judgment as more difficult 
to justify in the civil context than in the criminal context). 
 156. See Meir Katz, Note, Plainly Not “Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity on 
Direct Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979, 1992 (2004) (“Retroactivity focuses 
directly and exclusively upon law current at the time of decision and orders its 
application to all parallel and similar cases. Equality ensures law’s integrity and 
consistency.”). 
 157. See id. at 1993–94 (“Actual reliance, which is a major cause of 
retroactivity’s adverse effects, comes about by the failure to object to settled law—
that is by passivity and silence. Such reliance invokes sympathy, and it might be 
compelling if equality was not the foremost protected value.”). 
 158. See Stephens, supra note 138, at 1568 (noting that Harper is consistent 
with constitutional limits on judicial power). 
 159. See id. at 1565 (describing Justice Scalia’s view that “[a]llowing judges 
to render prospective rules of law encourages them to disregard established law”). 
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subsequent Supreme Court cases.160 In Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. 
Hyde,161 the Court dealt with the ramifications of its earlier 
decision holding unconstitutional an Ohio statute that applied 
different statutes of limitations to in-state and out-of-state 
defendants.162 Hyde conceded that the new decision rendering the 
aforementioned statute unconstitutional applied retroactively to 
her case because of Harper.163 While that could have been the end 
of the case, Hyde instead argued that the decision invalidating the 
Ohio statute should be examined through a lens of remedy rather 
than one of retroactivity.164 The Court rejected this proposed 
exception to the Harper rule and held that the Harper retroactivity 
rule applied to the case.165 As noted by the Court, recognizing a 
remedy exception to the retroactivity rule would leave Harper with 
nothing more than symbolic significance.166 In the most recent of 
the subsequent cases, Danforth v. Minnesota,167 the Court justified 
the Harper rule on the grounds that the judiciary does not create 
new law; rather, the source of the newly articulated rule is the 
Constitution itself.168 Although none of these cases accounts for the 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 n.32 (1994) (“While 
it was accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision 
was only presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a 
firm rule of retroactivity.”). 
 161. 514 U.S. 749 (1995). 
 162. See id. at 750–51 (“In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), this Court held unconstitutional (as impermissibly 
burdening interstate commerce) an Ohio ‘tolling’ provision that, in effect, gave 
Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state) 
defendants.”). 
 163. See id. at 752 (“Although one might think that is the end of the matter, 
Hyde ingeniously argues that it is not.”). 
 164. See id. (“States, she says, have a degree of legal leeway in fashioning 
remedies for constitutional ills.”). 
 165. See id. (reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding “that, despite 
Bendix, Ohio’s tolling law continues to apply to tort claims that accrued before 
that decision”). 
 166. See id. at 754 (“If Harper has anything more than symbolic significance, 
how could virtually identical reliance, without more, prove sufficient to permit a 
virtually identical denial simply because it is characterized as a denial based on 
‘remedy’ rather than ‘non-retroactivity?’”). 
 167. 552 U.S. 264 (2008). 
 168. See Allen, supra note 104, at 108 (explaining that retroactivity is 
required because the Court is simply articulating the existing law of the 
Constitution). 
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possibility of waiver in the context of personal jurisdiction 
defenses, the refusal of the Court to recognize exceptions in other 
contexts indicates that the firm rule of retroactivity should apply 
in all types of cases.169 
C. Retroactivity in the Personal Jurisdiction Context 
Scholars have dealt with retroactivity in the personal 
jurisdiction context, but the scholarship deals primarily with the 
permissibility of expanding long-arm statutes, not cutting back 
jurisdiction as a constitutional matter.170 The justification for the 
retroactivity of expanding long-arm statutes is firmly rooted in the 
notion that such laws do not affect substantive rights.171 In McGee 
v. International Life Insurance Co.,172 the characterization of 
expanding long-arm statutes as procedural, and thus not affecting 
substantive rights, was based on the fact that the petitioner’s 
ability to litigate was not impaired or enlarged by the statute.173 
In this way, cutting back jurisdiction as a constitutional 
matter is fundamentally different than expanding long-arm 
statutes. Whereas expanding long-arm statutes does not—as noted 
by the Court in McGee—impair the ability of a plaintiff to litigate 
against a defendant, cutting back jurisdiction as a constitutional 
matter does just that.174 In pending cases where the statute of 
limitations has often passed, the retroactive application of a more 
restrictive jurisdictional rule often will completely preclude the 
plaintiff from enforcing substantive rights against the defendant if 
                                                                                                     
 169. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 89 (1993) (failing 
to note any exceptions to the firm rule of adjudicative retroactivity). 
 170. See Ullian, supra note 108, at 1663 (explaining that expanded long-arm 
statutes can be applied retroactively because the laws are procedural). 
 171. See id. at 1665 (describing personal jurisdiction laws as generally 
procedural because they do not affect substantive rights). 
 172. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 173. See id. at 224 (“The statute was remedial, in the purest sense of that 
term, and neither enlarged nor impaired respondent’s substantive rights or 
obligations under the contract. It did nothing more than to provide petitioner with 
a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have against 
respondent.”). 
 174. See id. (explaining that the remedial statute “did nothing more than to 
provide petitioner with a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights 
she might have against respondent”). 
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the case is dismissed.175 In limited circumstances, however, it is 
not unprecedented in the civil context to have an indirect restraint 
on the general rule that all judicial decisions apply retroactively.176 
Perhaps most relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction is 
the indirect restraint of statutes of limitation, as illustrated by the 
following example: 
[I]f a court had previously held that there was no cause of action 
for a putative tort, but has now reversed itself to provide for 
liability (a decision which would necessarily have retroactive 
effect), the generally applicable civil tort statute of limitations 
would limit the retroactive application of the decision to alleged 
violations that occurred within the statutory limitations 
period.177 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two other judicially 
recognized indirect restraints on the general principle that judicial 
decisions apply retroactively in civil cases.178 
The courts have not considered the possibility that the waiver 
of personal jurisdiction defenses might be another procedural rule 
serving as an indirect restraint on retroactivity.179 Yet, waiver as 
an indirect restraint on the retroactive application of new judicial 
decisions could support an argument that Daimler cannot always 
be raised as a defense in long-pending cases.180 As discussed in the 
next Part, consent-based jurisdiction through waiver might render 
any lack of general personal jurisdiction irrelevant.181 This 
argument might be especially persuasive in light of the courts’ 
                                                                                                     
 175. See infra Part IV.B (explaining why this is a particularly problematic 
consequence of dismissing long-pending cases). 
 176. See Allen, supra note 104, at 109 (defining indirect restraints as “those 
in which other procedural rules serve as some external limitation on the 
retroactive application of new decisions”). 
 177. Id. at 110. 
 178. See id. (explaining several examples of indirect restraints on the 
retroactive effect of judicial decision in both civil and criminal cases). 
 179. See id. (omitting the waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense from the 
list of indirect restraint examples).  
 180. See id. (explaining that “[i]n the civil context, there are several indirect 
restraints on the application of the principle that all decisions have retrospective 
effect”). 
 181. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the concept of submission to the court as 
a primary basis for jurisdiction). 
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tendencies to disfavor retroactive laws unless the law is procedural 
or remedial.182 
Despite the attractiveness of this waiver argument to 
plaintiffs who do not want their cases dismissed as a result of 
Daimler, it is highly unlikely that any court would accept it as 
valid.183 The abovementioned procedural-versus-substantive law 
distinction is critical in determining the retroactivity of laws 
enacted by legislatures, but is meaningless when it comes to new 
constitutional interpretations announced by the judiciary.184 
Because the new Daimler decision is an instance of constitutional 
interpretation by the judiciary, the firm rule of retroactivity 
associated with all types of judicial decisions means that courts 
must allow defendants to utilize Daimler.185 Even if a court 
recognizes waiver as consent-based jurisdiction rendering general 
personal jurisdiction irrelevant, there are limits to consent-based 
jurisdiction that must apply in these long-pending cases.186 It does 
not matter whether there has been a previous waiver of the 
personal jurisdiction defense or how long the case has been 
pending.187 The firm rule of adjudicative retroactivity requires the 
application of new constitutional pronouncements in all 
circumstances without exception.188 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Ullian, supra note 108, at 1662 (“For procedural or remedial laws, a 
court reverses the [presumption that laws are prospective] and applies the law 
retroactively unless the legislature clearly intended for the law to apply 
prospectively only.”). 
 183. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the Daimler decision is an example 
of constitutional interpretation by the judiciary and that such interpretations 
always operate retroactively). 
 184. See supra Part III.B (emphasizing that today there is a firm rule of 
retroactivity for all judicial decisions). 
 185. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the current retroactivity doctrine 
for civil cases does not provide for any exceptions). 
 186. See infra Part IV (describing the relevant due process limits on consent-
based jurisdiction). 
 187. See infra Part IV (emphasizing that the firm rule of adjudicative 
retroactivity requires retroactive application of Daimler). 
 188. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the Supreme Court has never 
provided any exceptions to adjudicative retroactivity). 
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IV. Permitting Defendants to Raise the Daimler Test in 
Long-Pending Cases 
A. Two Categories of Cases Affected by the Daimler Decision 
There are two categories of cases affected by the Daimler 
decision: those in which the defendant raised a Rule 12(b)(2) 
defense before the Daimler decision189 and those in which the 
defendant did not.190  
1. First Category: When the Defendant Raised a Rule 12(b)(2) 
Defense Before Daimler 
The determinative factor in the first category is that the 
objection to personal jurisdiction can be renewed at any stage of 
the court proceedings.191 Furthermore, participating in litigation 
before pursuing a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is 
acceptable if the defendant raised the defense in an answer.192 In 
renewing the previously asserted objection to personal jurisdiction, 
the defendant will be able to benefit from any new standards and 
rules regarding the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction.193 
Thus, the new Daimler precedent applies through direct review in 
this first category of cases.194 The U.S. District Court for the 
                                                                                                     
 189. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-
GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (describing a case in 
which the defendant did raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense prior to Daimler). 
 190. See, e.g., Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-
D, 2014 WL 4471606, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept 10, 2014) (describing a situation in 
which the defendant failed to raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense prior to Daimler). 
 191. See Don Zupanec, Jurisdictional Defense—Waiver—Request for 
Affirmative Relief, 24 NO. 2 FED. LITIGATOR 10, 10 (2009) (explaining that raising 
the defense for lack of personal jurisdiction by motion under Rule 12(b) or in the 
answer “will preserve the defense”). 
 192. See Don Zupanec, Personal Jurisdiction Defense—Waiver, 21 NO. 9 FED. 
LITIGATOR 2, 2 (2006) (emphasizing that “a personal jurisdiction defense is not 
necessarily forfeited by a plaintiff’s failure to move promptly to dismiss on 
jurisdictional grounds after raising the defense in a responsive pleading”). 
 193. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (emphasizing 
that adjudicative retroactivity is a strict rule without any exceptions when it 
comes to pending cases). 
 194. See id. (providing the rule that full retroactive effect of all new judicial 
decisions must be given in all cases still open on direct review). 
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Southern District of Florida provides an example of the 
straightforward application of this rule with Aronson v. Celebrity 
Cruises, Inc.195 In that case—presumably because the law is so 
settled—the court did not even provide an analysis of why it was 
appropriate to apply the new Daimler decision.196 The court simply 
accepted that an earlier motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction could be renewed.197 It then dismissed the claim based 
on its application of Daimler.198 
2. Second Category: When the Defendant Did Not Raise a Rule 
12(b)(2) Defense Before Daimler 
The fact that the waiver doctrine of the personal jurisdiction 
defense is often inconsistently applied makes determining whether 
to apply Daimler in the second category of cases more 
complicated.199 For example, there is a history of basing 
jurisdiction on submission to the court—what Rule 12 calls 
waiver—and, generally, if there is one basis for jurisdiction, an 
additional basis is not required.200 Thus, if the basis for jurisdiction 
is consent through waiver, then there is an argument that general 
personal jurisdiction is not required at all.201 This would mean that 
                                                                                                     
 195. See 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1391 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (granting defendant’s 
renewed motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the new 
Daimler decision). 
 196. See id. (dismissing the claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)). 
 197. See id. (omitting any discussion of the validity of the renewed motion to 
dismiss). 
 198. See id. (“Given the extent of the California contacts deemed insufficient 
to establish general jurisdiction in Daimler, it is difficult to see how this Court 
could exercise general jurisdiction over Wrave based on its more attenuated 
contacts with Florida.”). 
 199. See Christina M. Manfredi, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Personal 
Jurisdiction Defenses: Why United States Courts Should Maintain a Rebuttable 
Presumption of Preclusion and Waiver Within the Context of International 
Litigation, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 233, 236–37 (2008) (explaining that the 
inconsistent application of the waiver doctrine is especially prevalent with 
international defendants). 
 200. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 894 (1989) (“Jurisdiction based on 
waiver, implied consent, or express contract is defensible as species of a knowing 
and intended submission to the jurisdiction of the state.”). 
 201. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 
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there is nothing unlawful about a judge not applying the new 
Daimler precedent because jurisdiction is based on consent rather 
than general personal jurisdiction.202 But as the controversy at 
issue in this Note demonstrates, courts have recognized that it is 
important to establish limits to consent-based jurisdiction.203 Such 
limits are especially important when the defendant did not have 
the opportunity to establish other grounds for lack of jurisdiction 
because of the case law that existed at the time of consent.204 
There should be relief from consent-based jurisdiction when 
the consenting defendant did not have notice of an available 
jurisdictional defense.205 While courts will generally deem the 
expressly consenting parties of a forum selection clause as 
knowingly waiving all jurisdictional defenses, there is no such 
notice when parties impliedly consent to jurisdiction.206 When 
consent is implicit and the jurisdictional defense comes from a 
change in personal jurisdiction law, the question is whether the 
law changed enough to conclude that the defendant did not have 
notice of that defense prior to the pronouncement of the new law.207 
                                                                                                     
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1073 (2012) (explaining that, independent of a general 
personal jurisdiction analysis, “consent is a proper basis for jurisdiction”). 
 202. See Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying and Coherent 
Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 139 (1992) (“The 
personal jurisdiction defense is a liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment that can be knowingly and voluntarily waived.”). 
 203. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked 
in the National Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1344 
(2005) (explaining that, historically, consent to jurisdiction has been “limited to 
particular claims”). 
 204. See id. at 1364 (“State-extracted waiver or consent to jurisdiction is 
subject to a due process inquiry, although the test is difficult to identify.”). 
 205. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 703–04 (1982) (suggesting that express or implied consent is valid when 
parties have notice of the waived jurisdictional defenses). 
 206. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) 
(providing that express consent to jurisdiction in a particular state is valid 
because the contract provided both parties with notice of the waiver of other 
jurisdictional defenses); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 
(1991) (providing that forum selection clauses are valid unless the clause is 
fundamentally unfair). 
 207. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal 
Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1658 (2001) (explaining that due process 
limitations are more of a concern with implied consent than with express 
consent). 
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If the change was such that the case law existing at the time of 
consent did not put the defendant on notice of the personal 
jurisdiction defense, then the change entitles the defendant to 
relief from consent-based jurisdiction.208 But if the previous case 
law did provide the defendant with notice of the newly pronounced 
personal jurisdiction defense, then there is no such relief.209 
Because Daimler provided its own distinct test on how to apply the 
at home standard, the case law existing at the time of defendants’ 
consent in long-pending cases did not provide adequate notice of 
the personal jurisdiction defense pronounced in Daimler.210 
Furthermore, strict adherence to consent-based jurisdiction 
would render the new Daimler precedent irrelevant in long-
pending cases.211 In practice, the fact that several judges presiding 
over these long-pending cases have accepted that defendants can 
assert general personal jurisdiction as an additional basis for 
jurisdiction provides evidence of the rejection of such strict 
adherence.212 The practical rejection of consent as the sole basis for 
jurisdiction in these long-pending cases is likely a recognition of 
the unfairness of this limitation to defendants.213 The injustice is 
obvious in cases in which the case law existing at the time of 
consent was not sufficient grounds for establishing a lack of 
general personal jurisdiction.214 In light of this practical rejection 
                                                                                                     
 208. See id. at 1659 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not delineate the scope of implied consent according to the legal theory 
pursued. . . . Rather, the scope of the plaintiff’s implied consent is defined in terms 
of what would be necessary for a fair resolution of the litigation between the 
parties.”). 
 209. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 704 (emphasizing that an effective 
waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense must be intentional). 
 210. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (describing this Note’s 
recommendation on how to reconcile Daimler and Goodyear). 
 211. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that there have been real consequences 
in long-pending cases because of Daimler). 
 212. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-
GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (permitting dismissal 
based on lack of general personal jurisdiction); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 
F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (determining that, in light of Daimler, the district 
court erred in finding that it could exercise general jurisdiction over the appellant 
bank). 
 213. See infra Part IV.B (describing the harsh consequences of dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction in long-pending cases). 
 214. See supra Part II.C (emphasizing that Daimler did change the existing 
personal jurisdiction law). 
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and the clear relevance of Daimler in the long-pending cases at 
issue, it seems that new cases developing the law of general 
personal jurisdiction do operate as a limit on consent as the sole 
basis for jurisdiction.215 Thus, this Note similarly rejects the 
validity of the notion that consent can serve as the sole basis for 
jurisdiction in these long-pending cases.216 
In accepting that general personal jurisdiction remains 
important regardless of consent-based jurisdiction in such cases, 
the timing of the assertion of a Rule 12 defense based on new case 
law is critical.217 Waiting too long to assert a Rule 12 defense after 
the Daimler decision could suggest that the defendant consents to 
jurisdiction even in the face of existing developments in general 
personal jurisdiction case law.218 Holzsager v. Valley Hospital219 
explains that “a party cannot be deemed to have waived objections 
or defenses which were not known to be available at the time they 
could first have been made, especially when it does raise the 
objections as soon as their cognizability is made apparent.”220 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether 
the court below erred in declining to apply retroactively an 
intervening Supreme Court decision about personal jurisdiction.221 
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Second Circuit rejected 
the appellee’s argument that the appellant could constructively 
waive a personal jurisdiction defense that did not exist at the time 
waiver would occur.222 Thus, personal jurisdiction is not waived 
                                                                                                     
 215. See infra Part IV.B (describing the practical relevance of Daimler in long-
pending cases). 
 216. See infra Part IV.B (describing how general personal jurisdiction has 
resulted in real dismissals even when there is an argument for consent-based 
jurisdiction). 
 217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (determining when a defense based on lack of 
personal jurisdiction is deemed waived). 
 218. See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 23 (1991) (emphasizing that consent is “one of the primary bases” for 
jurisdiction and that consent is the equivalent of failure to state an objection). 
 219. 646 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 220. Id. at 796. 
 221. See id. at 793 (explaining that the defendant wanted to utilize the Court’s 
decision in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), which held that “a plaintiff 
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant through quasi-
in-rem attachment of an insurance policy issued to the defendant by the 
defendant’s resident insurer”). 
 222. See id. at 795 (describing additional arguments put forth by appellee and 
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where intervening Supreme Court decisions declare current 
personal jurisdictional law unconstitutional.223 But if there is too 
much of a delay between the newly available objection and when 
the party raises the objection, the party risks waiving the 
defense.224 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expanded on 
the appropriate application of the Holzsager rule in Bennett v. City 
of Holyoke.225 This court explicitly limited the waiver exception to 
circumstances in which the authoritative case at the time of the 
waiver precluded the defense or a supervening authority made the 
defense available only after the waiver.226 In sum, an earlier 
waiver is excused “only when the defense, if timely asserted, would 
have been futile under binding precedent.”227 The Supreme Court 
also addressed this waiver issue in a context other than personal 
jurisdiction.228 The Court explained that for a waiver to be 
effective, it must “be one of a ‘known right or privilege.’”229 There 
is no waiver of a defense when the decision that would support that 
defense does not exist yet.230 
Applying this Holzsager rule to long-pending cases potentially 
affected by Daimler, one of the crucial questions is whether 
Daimler announced a new constitutional rule or overruled 
Goodyear.231 The issue is further complicated because there is a 
legitimate argument that Daimler simply clarified the personal 
jurisdiction law that already existed after Goodyear.232  
                                                                                                     
rejected by the Second Circuit). 
 223. See id. at 796 (explaining that a right cannot be waived if the right is not 
known at the time waiver would occur). 
 224. See id. (noting that failure to raise an immediate defense based on the 
newly available authority will be considered waiver). 
 225. See Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (providing 
the two situations in which the Holzsager exception applies). 
 226. See id. (noting that these two circumstances require application of the 
“equitable exception”). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 142 (1967) (addressing waiver 
in the context of a party failing to assert certain arguments before trial). 
 229. Id. at 143 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 230. See id. (describing the common sense notion that a party cannot waive a 
defense that does not exist). 
 231. See supra Part II.C (examining both sides of this Daimler debate). 
 232. See supra Part II.C (proposing that this argument is flawed). 
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In Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority,233 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
referenced Holzsager in its analysis of whether the defendants 
waived the personal jurisdiction defense.234 The court correctly 
described the Holzsager rule as providing an exception to waiver of 
a defense when the legal basis for the defense did not exist yet, 
except when the defendant does not raise the defense based on the 
newly available authority in a timely manner.235 Where the court 
was incorrect, however, was in its determination that Goodyear 
provided the same legal basis for the defense as Daimler and, thus, 
the waiver exception did not apply.236 Thus, the court denied the 
waiver exception to defendants based on its conclusion that 
Daimler did not announce a new constitutional rule.237 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 
reached the same conclusion based on the Holzsager rule in 
American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon.238 
This court also accurately articulated the Holzsager waiver 
exception and similarly rejected the defendant’s contention that 
Daimler provided a legal basis for the general personal jurisdiction 
defense distinct from Goodyear.239 Like the Gilmore court, this 
court ignored the fact that while Daimler did preserve the 
underlying premise of Goodyear, the clearer and much more 
specific Daimler rule does constitute a new constitutional 
pronouncement.240  
                                                                                                     
 233. 8 F. Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 234. See id. at 13 (emphasizing that the Holzsager rule requires parties to 
immediately raise a newly available defense). 
 235. See id. (explaining that “an unavailable defense is not, under Rule 12(h), 
waived by omission from an earlier Rule 12 motion”). 
 236. See id. at 15 (arguing that Goodyear and Daimler pronounced the same 
at home standard). 
 237. See id. (explaining correctly that the Holzsager waiver exception applies 
only to previously unavailable defenses). 
 238. See Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 
WL 4471606, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014) (concluding that Daimler did not 
change the Goodyear rule). 
 239. See id. at *2 (reaching the incorrect conclusion that “Daimler did not 
create a basis for challenging personal jurisdiction not previously available to 
Defendant”). 
 240. See id. at *3 (focusing too narrowly on the underlying at home standard 
maintained by both Goodyear and Daimler). 
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If, as this Note argues, the Gilmore and American Fidelity 
conclusions were incorrect, then there is also the question of 
whether waiver matters at all in light of the retroactivity of new 
constitutional pronouncements. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York found that it did not matter in 
Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd.241 But even though the court agreed 
with the defendants that their failure to raise the personal 
jurisdiction defense before Daimler did not constitute waiver, the 
seven-month delay between the Daimler decision and the 
defendants’ assertion of the defense did result in its waiver.242 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
has adhered to the view that if there is a new test for determining 
the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction, the defendants have 
the right to use it.243 This district has decided to apply the new 
Daimler test even when the defendants ignored possible personal 
jurisdiction defenses up until the release of the Daimler 
decision.244 This seems to be the correct decision based on the 
conclusion that Daimler did expand upon the Goodyear at home 
standard and thus, should be considered a new constitutional 
decision.245 Because new constitutional decisions must be given 
retroactive effect, this court correctly allowed the defendants to 
use Daimler even in the face of their previous failure to raise any 
personal jurisdiction defenses.246 
                                                                                                     
 241. See Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 3419(GBD), 2015 WL 
1499185, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (“This Court agrees with the Non-
Stipulating Defendants that their Rule 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense was not 
available before Daimler.”). 
 242. See id. at *7 (“Defendants waived their personal jurisdiction defenses by 
failing to promptly assert them after Daimler was decided.”). 
 243. See Brush, supra note 1 (explaining that a bank defendant was allowed 
to use Daimler in September and have a long-pending case dismissed); see also 
Laydon, 2015 WL 1499185, at *6 (refusing to rule that the defendants waived 
their personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it prior to the Daimler 
decision). 
 244. See Brush, supra note 1 (describing the banking defendants as having 
“‘sat on their hands’ with regard to jurisdictional defenses prior to this August” 
by not pursuing any personal jurisdiction defense until the Daimler decision); see 
also Laydon, 2015 WL 1499185, at *6 (“[T]his Court does not rule that the Non-
Stipulating Defendants waived their personal jurisdiction defenses because they 
failed to raise them in their June 2013 motions to dismiss.”). 
 245. See supra Part II.C (arguing that Daimler changed the Goodyear rule 
even though the two decisions are not inconsistent). 
 246. See supra Part III.B (stating the conclusiveness of the Supreme Court’s 
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Not all courts, however, have adhered to this reconciliation 
of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction and retroactivity 
decisions. In American Fidelity, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma found that waiver of the personal 
jurisdiction defense did preclude the defendant from asserting 
the new Daimler test and denied the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.247 Both this 
interpretation of waiver and the court’s interpretation of the 
Daimler holding are of real importance to this Note’s argument.248 
Because this court views Daimler as simply clarifying Goodyear 
rather than articulating a new test altogether, the court finds 
that the same defense was available to the defendant even before 
the Daimler decision.249 Yet, the defendant still chose to waive the 
personal jurisdiction defense.250 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Gilmore 
also held that the waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense 
precludes the defendant from asserting the new Daimler test.251 
That court also based its decision on the assertion that Goodyear 
already stated the rule, which Daimler simply clarified.252 Based 
on the earlier discussion of Daimler in relation to Goodyear, it 
                                                                                                     
position that new constitutional decisions must be given full retroactive effect). 
 247. See Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 
WL 4471606, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014) (“Granting such relief would be 
inconsistent with the Court’s finding that Defendant has waived the lack of 
personal jurisdiction defense.”). 
 248. See id. at *3 (“Indeed, multiple statements by the Court in Daimler 
demonstrate that the standard Defendant relies upon was clearly first expressed 
in Goodyear.”). 
 249. See id. at *5 (“Goodyear announced the ‘at home’ standard relied upon by 
Defendant. Because that standard was available more than two years ago, 
Defendant has not demonstrated the defense of lack of general personal 
jurisdiction was ‘unavailable’ until January 2014 when Daimler was decided.”). 
 250. See id. (explaining that the same, or at least a very similar, personal 
jurisdiction defense was always available to the defendant). 
 251. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 17 
(D.D.C. 2014) (“Defendants forfeited their jurisdictional defense both by omitting 
it from their 2002 Motion to Dismiss and by failing to promptly assert it after 
Goodyear was decided. Consequently the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over 
them.”). 
 252. See id. at 15 (“Even if Defendants were correct that a legal basis to 
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction did not exist until the announcement of the ‘at 
home’ rule . . . they are flat-out wrong that Daimler was the genesis of that rule.”). 
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seems that these two courts ruled incorrectly.253 Because these 
courts anchored their reasoning on the assumption that Daimler 
did not change Goodyear, the argument that Daimler provides new 
guidance on how to apply Goodyear disrupts the soundness of the 
two courts’ conclusions.254 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
established that new constitutional decisions are retroactive, so 
the two courts’ waiver arguments depend upon the position that 
Daimler did not change Goodyear.255 Because such a position is not 
in accord with Daimler, the waiver argument cannot stand and the 
defendants in these two cases—like those in all long-pending 
cases—should have been allowed to raise Daimler.256 
B. Consequences of Applying the Daimler Decision in 
Long-Pending Cases 
The most problematic consequence of courts applying the new 
Daimler decision in long-pending cases is the possibility of the case 
being dismissed outright.257 As discussed in the previous subpart, 
statutes of limitations make dismissal especially unfair to 
plaintiffs.258 Even if the statute of limitations had not expired and 
the plaintiff could bring the case again in a different jurisdiction, 
the case would have to start over from the beginning.259 
Transferring the case instead would allow the plaintiff to pick the 
                                                                                                     
 253. See supra Part II.C (arguing that although Daimler is consistent with 
Goodyear, the new decision did offer additional guidance and clarification not 
present in Goodyear). 
 254. See supra Part II.C (noting that Daimler did expand upon Goodyear’s at 
home standard). 
 255. See supra Part III.B (explaining the significance of Harper v. Virginia 
Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)). 
 256. See supra Part III.B (stating the rule that full retroactive effect must be 
given to all new constitutional decisions for cases on direct review). 
 257. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (listing recent cases in which 
judges granted dismissals). 
 258. See Allen, supra note 104, at 109 (describing statutes of limitations as an 
indirect restraint on retroactivity). 
 259. See Jeremy Jay Butler, Note, Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks 
Personal Jurisdiction: Where Are Courts Going with 28 U.S.C. § 1631?, 40 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 789, 789 (2006) (noting that transfer avoids the unnecessary step of 
refiling a claim in a different court). 
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case up where it left off in the first jurisdiction.260 Furthermore, 
federal law instructs district courts to transfer rather than dismiss 
when possible and “in the interest of justice.”261 Yet, judges are 
afforded discretion in deciding what is in the interest of justice and 
many are using that discretion to choose dismissal over transfer.262  
In Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Ally Financial, 
Inc.,263 the judge presiding over the case rejected the plaintiff’s 
motion to sever and transfer the claims affected by the new 
personal jurisdiction argument.264 Even though there would have 
been personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, to 
which the defendant requested the case be transferred, the judge 
decided instead to dismiss all claims lacking personal jurisdiction 
in Massachusetts, where the claims had been brought.265 In light 
of the previous discussion, the judge was correct in allowing the 
defendant to utilize the new Daimler decision.266 Had there not 
been any other federal court with personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants, the judge also would have been correct in denying the 
plaintiff’s motion to transfer.267 But that was not the situation in 
this case.268 Out of consideration of relevant statutes of limitations 
                                                                                                     
 260. See id. at 789 (“Venue transfer is one aspect of venue that Congress 
created to improve the efficient change of courtrooms when either the public or 
the defendant demands a more convenient forum.”). 
 261. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012). 
 262. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that dismissals are 
being granted even when transfer is an option). 
 263. No. 11-10952-GAO, 2014 WL 4964506 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2012). 
 264. See David McAfee, Daimler Frees Moody’s, S&P From Bank’s $5.9B MBS 
Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
583381/daimler-frees-moody-s-s-p-from-bank-s-5-9b-mbs-suit (last visited Sept. 
28, 2015) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction in light of the Daimler ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 265. See id. (“Judge O’Toole rejected the Bank of Boston’s bid to sever the 
rating agency claims and transfer them to the Southern District of New York, 
where personal jurisdiction over them exists, instead deciding to dismiss them in 
their entirety.”). 
 266. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that personal jurisdiction and retroactivity 
law requires judges to allow defendants to use the new Daimler decision even 
when personal jurisdiction defenses have already been waived). 
 267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (providing that cases can be transferred 
only to another district where the case “might have been brought” or to which “all 
parties have consented”). 
 268. See McAfee, supra note 264 (noting that there was another federal court 
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in long-pending cases, the judge should not have dismissed the 
case when transfer was a lawful alternative.269  
Another possible consequence of courts applying the Daimler 
decision in long-pending cases is the special treatment of foreign 
defendants at the expense of domestic plaintiffs. One of the main 
differences between the Court’s opinions in Daimler and Goodyear 
is that Daimler provides a lengthy discussion on the risk that 
expansive personal jurisdiction poses to international comity 
whereas Goodyear only refers to the issue in one footnote.270 The 
concern stems from consideration of the fact that outside of the 
United States, most nations have a much more restrictive idea of 
when defendants should be subject to personal jurisdiction in any 
given forum.271  
Looking at Daimler generally, the decision makes litigation 
against foreign corporations much more difficult.272 It is possible 
that some courts might be looking for reasons to allow foreign 
defendants to use the new Daimler test, even when personal 
jurisdiction defenses have been waived, to “accord with the fair 
play and substantial justice due process demands.”273 Additionally, 
courts might be choosing to dismiss cases that could easily be 
                                                                                                     
with personal jurisdiction over the defendants). 
 269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (providing that judges can transfer cases when 
transfer is “in the interest of justice”). 
 270. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (“Other nations 
do not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the 
Court of Appeals in this case.”); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 n.5 (2011) (describing the French law that permits 
jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s relationship with the forum). 
 271. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (“In the European Union, for example, a 
corporation may generally be sued in the nation in which it is ‘domiciled,’ a term 
defined to refer only to the location of the corporation’s ‘statutory seat,’ ‘central 
administration,’ or ‘principal place of business.’”). 
 272. See Denker, supra note 92, at 164 (“Since Daimler provides a clear, 
narrow rule that denotes where a Non-U.S. corporation is subject to liability, 
plaintiffs will have a harder time justifying a lawsuit against a Non-U.S. 
corporation.”); see also Pertlette Michéle Jura et al., Disparate Treatment of the 
Corporate Citizen: Stark Differences Across Borders in Transnational Lawsuits, 
15 No. 2 BUS. L. INT’L 85, 92 (2014) (indicating that Daimler is part of the Court’s 
attempt “to make clear that already overburdened US courts are not required to 
entertain multinational suits having little or nothing to do with the US—and in 
some cases (perhaps many)—they do not have the jurisdictional power to do so”). 
 273. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763. 
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transferred.274 Expansive jurisdiction tests create an international 
comity problem because they allow “any forum in the United States 
to resolve any dispute arising anywhere in the world.”275 The 
Daimler ruling prompts judges to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
over many foreign corporate defendants, thus mitigating the 
problem.276 Instead, the courts simply accept the judgments of 
foreign jurisdictions.277 
A related motivation for allowing defendants in long-pending 
cases to utilize Daimler is that the decision provides an incentive 
for foreign companies to invest and conduct business in the United 
States and consequently has the potential to stimulate the U.S. 
economy.278 The stricter guidance for the at home standard 
provided by Daimler gives foreign companies more certainty about 
“the jurisdictional consequences of their actions” in the United 
States, which in turn minimizes the risk of doing business in and 
with the United States.279 
As mentioned above, this special treatment of foreign 
defendants in the interest of international comity comes at a cost 
for U.S. plaintiffs.280 With Daimler, “[g]eneral jurisdiction, the sole 
                                                                                                     
 274. See Denker, supra note 92, at 170 (explaining that courts want to avoid 
raising “tensions between the United States and other nations”). 
 275. Id. 
 276. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (explaining the 
view of the Solicitor General that “foreign governments’ objections to some 
domestic courts’ expansive views of general jurisdiction have in the past impeded 
negotiations of international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments”). 
 277. See id. (noting that lenient bases for the exercise of general personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant often lead to international friction). 
 278. See Denker, supra note 92, at 166–67 (“Because the type of ‘litigation 
environment critically influences a foreign company’s decision to invest in the 
United States,’ it is clear that lower anticipated costs will lead to more capital 
investment.”). 
 279. See id. at 166 (“[W]hen a corporation can predict which forums have the 
capability of holding it liable, it has the ability to buy insurance, the opportunity 
to incorporate the costs of potential litigation into its products’ prices, and the 
chance to decide whether to operate in a state whose costs outweigh its benefits.”). 
 280. See Kate Bonacorsi, Note, Not at Home with “At-Home” Jurisdiction, 37 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1821, 1853 (2014) (“[G]eneral jurisdiction occasionally served 
as a jurisdictional basis of last resort. When US plaintiffs could not make 
showings sufficient for specific jurisdiction, especially in cases against non-US 
corporations, courts allowed plaintiffs to make a showing of the defendant’s 
‘continuous and systematic’ business activities in the forum state.”). 
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door to relief for U.S. plaintiffs when the minimum contacts 
approach was otherwise too narrow, is now officially closed.”281 In 
a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor addressed this injustice to 
individuals harmed by the actions of the multinational 
corporations benefitting from the Daimler decision.282 In many 
instances, Daimler may result in foreign corporate defendants 
never being held accountable for their actions against U.S. 
plaintiffs.283 This cost is especially severe for the plaintiffs in the 
long-pending cases that are being dismissed as a result of courts 
allowing foreign defendants to utilize the new Daimler decision 
even when those defendants previously waived the personal 
jurisdiction defense.284 
Judges should act in accordance with both personal 
jurisdiction and retroactivity law by allowing these foreign 
defendants to utilize the new Daimler decision.285 Moreover, judges 
should mitigate the cost to plaintiffs of using Daimler in long-
pending cases by transferring the case when possible.286 In the case 
of foreign defendants, however, there often will be no venue in the 
United States with personal jurisdiction over the defendant when 
the Daimler rule is applied.287 Thus, judges will overwhelmingly 
                                                                                                     
 281. Id. 
 282. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (“[F]or example, 
a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign hotel owned by 
a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to account in a 
single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has a massive presence in multiple 
States.”). 
 283. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward 
a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 222 (2014) 
(“If plaintiffs are injured outside their home state, they must sue in the 
defendant’s home state or in the location where they suffered the injury, even if 
the defendant has substantial operations in the plaintiff’s home state.”). 
 284. See Bonacorsi, supra note 280, at 1857 (emphasizing the unfairness to 
plaintiffs resulting from Daimler and that “the Court once again favored 
defendants to the detriment of US plaintiffs”). 
 285. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that new constitutional decisions should be 
given full retroactive effect even in the face of waiver of the personal jurisdiction 
defense). 
 286. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that judges should exercise their discretion 
to transfer “in the interest of justice” to plaintiffs in long-pending cases with 
expired statutes of limitations). 
 287. See Denker, supra note 92, at 164 (stating the severely limiting effect of 
the Daimler decision on personal jurisdiction in the United States over foreign 
defendants). 
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dismiss these cases, leaving no alternative remedy for plaintiffs to 
pursue within the United States. While this result is certainly 
unfair to many plaintiffs, and in part a consequence of 
international comity concerns, it is the correct result in light of 
personal jurisdiction and retroactivity law.288 Still, judges should 
continue to exercise their discretion to transfer cases rather than 
dismiss where another venue in the United States has personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, whether that defendant is 
domestic or foreign.  
V. Conclusion 
In the interests of fairness and predictability, the controversy 
encapsulated by Judge Daniels’s comment requires a consistent 
solution to be applied across federal courts.289 For the solution to 
be lawful, it must account for both personal jurisdiction law and 
retroactivity law. An analysis of the development of personal 
jurisdiction law indicates that Daimler did more than restate the 
Goodyear test. Rather, Daimler narrowed the scope of general 
personal jurisdiction beyond what any defendant could have 
reasonably believed was required by Goodyear. Next, an analysis 
of the current state of retroactivity law in the civil context reveals 
a strict rule of adjudicative retroactivity. There is no permissible 
exception to this rule for new constitutional pronouncements in the 
personal jurisdiction context, not even in the face of waiver. Thus—
because Daimler was a new constitutional pronouncement of 
personal jurisdiction law—defendants should be allowed to utilize 
Daimler regardless of whether they previously raised a Rule 
12(b)(2) defense.  
While this reconciliation of the law clearly demands that 
Daimler apply in long-pending cases, this solution poses problems 
of its own. In many cases, the application of Daimler results in a 
determination that the court can no longer exercise jurisdiction 
over the defendant. If the court consequently dismisses the case, a 
                                                                                                     
 288. See supra Parts II–III (explaining why personal jurisdiction law and 
retroactivity law, respectively, require this result). 
 289. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the view that 
Daimler is a new constitutional test that defendants in long-pending cases are 
entitled to utilize). 
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plaintiff whose cause of action now has an expired statute of 
limitations will be left without a judicial remedy. Thus, when 
transfer is possible in cases that would otherwise be dismissed 
because of lack of personal jurisdiction under Daimler, judges 
should make every effort to allow transfer. A dismissal would be 
especially unfair in cases where the defendant waived the personal 
jurisdiction defense, and the plaintiff continued with litigation in 
reliance on such waiver. Because of the special impact of Daimler 
on foreign defendants, however, it will sometimes be the case that 
no court in the United States will be able to exercise jurisdiction 
under Daimler. Courts should limit the harsh consequences of 
dismissal in long-pending cases to these cases in which there is no 
other alternative. 
